2. NO notion of “shared security’ with the EU

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GEOMETR.IT  ecfr.eu

* Splits between Germany and Poland vis-à-vis Russia signal deeper divisions in the alliance, ones which threaten European security

Meanwhile, Poland’s national-populist government has made plain it considers that Russia’s non-compliance with arms control agreements requires no new diplomatic invitations. Warsaw’s idée fixe is a bilateral strategic partnership with the US which would involve a permanent military base (the so-called “Fort Trump”), arms contracts, and cooperation on some international issues.

The Polish foreign minister, Jacek Czaputowicz, recently made headlines by telling Der Spiegel that, given the collapse of the INF treaty, he would support the deployment of American missiles in Europe. The ministry quickly corrected that comment, saying Czaputowicz had spoken about the presence of the US nuclear weapons in Europe in general, not new rockets. But there is little doubt that Warsaw would indeed welcome them. Nor is there much doubt as to how Germany would react to such a development. 

Putin is very well aware of all those tensions and is excited to exploit them. A case in point is the US missile defence system Aegis Ashore, which is designed to defend America against Iran. Its elements are being built in Poland and are supposed to become operational in 2020.

Putin claimed in his state of the union speech, once again, that the system violates the INF treaty and threatens Russia, as mere software changes would allow the installation to be used for offensive purposes. This argument convinces many, not at least in Germany. A claim frequently made in the European debate is that abandoning the missile shield could bring Russia back into the fold on arms control. This has all the makings of another intra-European battle, as Poland views the US missile shield on its soil as core to its security partnership with America.

 To believe that Europe’s only choice is between nuclear rearmament and doing nothing is folly: NATO could find ways to respond both militarily – in conventional terms – and diplomatically, through an arms control initiative. But what is more important than the substance of NATO’s reaction is that the alliance should display a common approach. 

The INF treaty used to be a cornerstone of European security and a more than symbolic expression of the strategic bond between Europe and the US. Signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, it banned the deployment in Europe of medium-range missiles (500-5,500 kilometres), whose existence had presented a massive risk to European population centres and threatened to decouple Europe’s security from America’s.

  • The treaty removed the danger of a regional nuclear war in Europe. But in recent years Russia has repeatedly violated the agreement by developing a new generation of missiles exceeding the allowed range of 500 kilometres.
  • However, the reason the US is withdrawing from the treaty is unrelated to Russia: it has much more to do with China not being a signatory, and having stockpiled medium-range missiles that threaten the balance of power in the Pacific. Washington wants to have the freedom to counteract Beijing’s military build-up, whereas the INF ban only ties its hands. 

The implications of this for Europe are severe. Countries in central and eastern Europe worry that Russia will use the collapse of the arms control regime to strengthen its nuclear posture on NATO’s eastern rim. The current balance of conventional and nuclear forces between NATO and Russia already plays largely to Moscow’s advantage: while there are only 180 American tactical nukes deployed in Europe (including 20 in Germany), Russia already has at least ten times more. 

There are no easy solutions here. No US medium-range missiles (which do not exist yet) are likely to be deployed soon in Europe, and nor is a multilateral arms control agreement likely to be signed. Likewise, a “Europeanisation” of France’s nuclear deterrence, which is sometimes proposed by analysts as a solution, will prove to be an illusion of no less proportion than all-weather US guarantees.

Europe is entering yet more unstable and dangerous times. The worst that Europeans can do is to walk into them divided. As much as they fret about the widening gap between the US and the European Union, the new splits appearing within Europe – not least between Germany and Poland – deserve no less attention.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This commentary, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors.

The publication is not an editorial. It reflects solely the point of view and argumentation of the author. The publication is presented in the presentation. Start in the previous issue. The original is available at: ecfr.eu



  1. Whilst the EU must remain vigilant to other emerging threats that also require a coordinated EU response, the Agenda prioritises terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension, where EU action can make a real difference. The Agenda builds on the actions undertaken in the last years, under the previous internal security strategy, thus ensuring consistent and continued action.

  2. To maximise the benefits of existing EU measures and, where necessary, deliver new and complementary actions, all actors involved have to work together based on five key principles:

    Ensure full compliance with fundamental rights;
    Guarantee more transparency, accountability and democratic control;
    Ensure better application and implementation of existing EU legal instruments;
    Provide a more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach;
    Bring together all internal and external dimensions of security.

  3. What should be the European Union’s role in international politics? How should the EU deal with the challenges posed by instability, terrorism, radicalisation and conflict to the South and the East? Can the EU’s commitment to democratisation, human rights and international law be upheld or does it require rethinking and reorientation?

  4. In times of great uncertainty for the very future of the European project, the EUGS still risks to remain unnoticed (and thus unread) by policy makers and the wider public alike, both in Europe and beyond. Yet, its potential contribution to stronger foreign policy cohesion across the ‘Old Continent’ might provide a useful sectoral contribution for Europe’s political integration to restart on new foundations. A robust and audience-tailored communication and dissemination campaign on the EUGS’s key messages thus needs to be prioritised in the months to come.

  5. The need for an analytically solid and meaningfully prescriptive analysis of the regional and global strategic landscape surrounding Europe was, in fact, largely overdue. A deteriorating geopolitical environment in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, politico-security turbulence in regions at ‘strategic distance’ such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Far East, the rise of increasingly transnational challenges like terrorism, climate change and cyberattacks, and the very crisis of the European project itself, all dismissed the comforting incipit of the 2003 European Security Strategy: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free”.

  6. At first sight it has been a very eventful year: the United Kingdom is in the process of exiting the EU, Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States, there were terrorist attacks in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Manchester and London, and the Turkish referendum had its fallout in cities in Western Europe.

  7. Of course, this would require a major intellectual and political effort, comprehensive of a series of interdependent, multiple long-term analysis. In a more brief-term perspective, this preliminary work will try to capture some of the essential elements characterising the key issues of security and defence at the European level in the aftermath of the new EU Global Strategy and its implementation.

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