What to expect in Warsaw-1

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GEOMETR.IT    neweasterneurope.eu

*To be or not to be. Let`s talk. NATO’s defence capabilities was agreed at the previous Wales Summit.  NATO is split on the issue of how and where the Alliance’s abilities to defend itself have to be improved.

In the East, Russia undermines our European peace, as well as international laws and norms, through its blatantly aggressive annexation of Crimea and “soft” invasion of eastern Ukraine. The West has responded decisively to these actions as the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions against Russia and these sanctions bite. Germany will not recognise the annexation of Crimea by Moscow. Likewise, only through a thorough implementation of the Minsk Agreements can Moscow’s aggression in eastern Ukraine be stopped and peace restored. The Alliance stands firm on this.

1QAS

  • Russia’s neo-imperial foreign policy in Eastern Europe has shown that the core function of NATO, the Article 5 commitment that an attack on one NATO member is attack on all, is still valid and relevant.
  • Therefore, a comprehensive package of measures and military reinforcements to strengthen NATO’s defence capabilities was agreed at the previous Wales Summit.
  • However, NATO is split on the issue of how and where the Alliance’s abilities to defend itself have to be improved.
  • Southern Alliance members, especially Italy and Turkey, are concerned that the Atlantic Alliance might concentrate too much on Eastern Europe while the risks and challenges in the Middle East and along the Northern African coastline will be underestimated. While in Eastern Europe, so-called “hybrid” warfare is the current “hype”, and this narrative is a tough sell in Southern Europe due to the more complex security situation there.

North-South divide

The threats coming out of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, including failing states, mass migration and extremism, have to be addressed beyond simple military solutions. An appropriate response demands a combination of humanitarian and socio-economic approaches, border police, in addition to military measures, and closer co-operation with the North African states in security matters, including the stabilisation of countries like Libya, where ISIS has recently begun operations.

Many NATO partners are also involved in Syria (US, France, the United Kingdom and Turkey). Germany also contributes there. We support the coalition with Tornado reconnaissance aircraft. In Iraq we support the Kurdish Peshmerga with equipment and training. However, a formal NATO involvement is unnecessary and politically inopportune in many cases. What is important is that we support our NATO partner Turkey, who views the Russian intervention very critically. We need to refocus the situation so that we can begin a political process that can lead to greater stability.

There is also a high probability that the European refugee crisis will have unforeseeable consequences for NATO debates. Some southern NATO members might wish for more solidarity regarding the ongoing refugee crisis and will point to the need for a NATO-supported EU border protection operation. It is possible that our southern partners will demand that the new Rapid Reaction Force must also be suitable for missions along the southern flanks of Europe.

As a result, Germany, France and the UK will need to consider positions which reduce the tensions between the “North” and “South”. The US will surely strive for unity in the Alliance. The Americans will push the Europeans again to show more leadership in security matters, as well as to increase their defence budget spending to the required two per cent threshold of their gross domestic product (GDP). Currently, only five states are able to meet this target, although six have increased their defence spending in 2015.

Due to its internal political situation, Germany will not be able to reach this target, which amounts to some 50 billion euros. There are also ongoing considerations to deviate from this static two per cent rule and to choose military effectiveness as a measure of fair burden-sharing. However, such qualitative criteria are more difficult to measure and compare.

In search of a common response

Another issue that NATO countries will need to address at the summit is the new dimensions of a potential Article 5 situation. Specifically, countries will need to examine Article 5 in the context of “Smart Defence” or initiatives such as the “Framework Nation Concept”, in which NATO countries are grouped for certain military tasks.

  • Russia has shown that it can mobilise and concentrate several thousand men in so-called “Snap Exercises” within two to three days. The 5,000 person NATO rapid reaction force cannot cope with these Russian capabilities in an emergency, since their reaction time is around five to seven days.
  • NATO is also concerned about Russian plans to develop “area denial” measures designed to block parts of Eastern Europe in case of a conflict, essentially cutting NATO supply lines or cleaving the alliance through nuclear threats.
  • Here, corresponding counter-concepts are required. However, due to the different geographical interests within the Alliance, finding both a common and appropriate response to the Russian threat will be difficult to achieve.

In my view it makes little sense to continue the ongoing discussion as to whether NATO combat troops should be stationed on a permanent or rotational basis, as the decision by the US to send an armoured brigade to Eastern Europe effectively ended that debate. It is far more important that the stationed forces are in place in case of emergency, with the ability to be used both in and outside of Europe.

The security situation in Europe is, quite frankly, very precarious. We need more flexibility in our response, not just to follow the antiquated measures of “Forward Defence” concepts for the old eastern Polish border that bear no relevance to today’s situation. With the advent of “hybrid warfare”, we should really be looking for “hybrid solutions”.

The debate on retaining the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the 1997 agreement which established relations between Russia and NATO, is also superfluous. None of the NATO measures for improving the deterrence and defence capability of the Alliance is contrary to the Founding Act. Therefore, a formal termination of this document by NATO would only provide Kremlin propagandists with useful pretexts. Furthermore, termination would be contrary to the principle: “pacta sunt servanda”.

  • Particularly sensitive will be the question of the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy. NATO’s “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review” (DDPR) is based on the principle that Russia is a partner of NATO and would not use its nuclear capabilities against the Alliance.
  • Both conditions appear to be no longer valid. Russia under Vladimir Putin has defined itself as an anti-western power.
  • In addition, Russian military exercises are simulating the use of nuclear weapons against Poland, which is also threatened by the further transfer of nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad (not to mention Russia’s frequent violation of Polish airspace with nuclear-capable fighter aircraft).
  • Thus, there is a necessity to look for a new a new nuclear strategic consensus in the Alliance.

A credible nuclear deterrent is necessary, even though this is more complicated today than it was during the Cold War. Generally, it is more difficult to deter Russia in the role of a “declining power” than as a rising one. Despite its inferiority in absolute terms, we have to face the fact that Russia can concentrate combat troops much faster than NATO can react. So the different reaction times and the future role of nuclear weapons will form the basis of necessary and important discussions in Warsaw.

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GEOMETR.IT

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5 Comments

  1. Moldova’s elite has consistently lacked the will to reform a political system that primarily serves its own interests, yet the EU has turned a blind eye to the abuses of successive governments for years.

  2. Plahotniuc should not have a reason to oppose a semi-parliamentary/presidential system, afterall Moldova hardly ever stopped being one, besides Plahotniuc already sees himself president – so why not? Dodon certainly would not mind. As for the pro-EU opposition, well, if they could not agree on a single candidate before, this would only complicate things even further. Ultimately, it is all about rising to the occasion!

  3. This is the “popular democracy” today. And this scenario can not be launched against a so-called “pro-European” power, as corrupt and inefficient it might be, because the criterion for being kept in power is not the will of the people or popular trust, as the source of power was exported. Thus, a network of puppet states is being set up in the post-Soviet space.

  4. Too late – Moldova has been in a permanent economic and social crisis since forever. From the time they signed that famous association agreement with the EU, the crisis got worse: usual things – de-industrialization, loss of traditional markets (Russian) without the possibility of getting access to the EU agricultural market (Ukraine, beware!), total corruption – what else is new? A third of the country’s population is working in Russia, which allows them to survive, just barely.

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